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Abstract Aggregate expenditure in education was compared to PISA’s scores (2012) as a mean of
understanding how money link to performance. We analysed global education expenditure, teachers’ pay, class
size and number of teaching hours, infrastructure and teaching resources investment in European countries.
Four groups of efficiency / effectiveness are proposed based on the combination of expense versus results. The
author concludes that the most effective countries are Poland, Slovenia and Czech Republic, as they achieve top
results with moderate investment. There are also some countries where desired score is achieved, though a lot of
money is being spent. The remaining countries do not achieve desired scores and therefore are neither efficient
nor effective, though Sweden and Norway spend a lot of money for very poor results, and are therefore the most
inefficient countries.
Keywords: education efficiency, public expenditure, PISA scores, education effectiveness.
Resumo A despesa agregada na educação foi comparada com os resultados no teste PISA (2012) como
forma de compreender a ligação da despesa em educação com o desempenho dos alunos. Analisou-se a
despesa agregada em educação, o ordenado dos professores, o tamanho das turmas e o número de aulas
lecionadas, assim como o investimento em infraestruturas e recursos de ensino em países da Europa. Quatro
grupos de eficiência / eficácia são propostos, baseados na combinação despesa versus resultados. Conclui-se
que os países mais eficientes são a Polónia, a Eslovénia e a República Checa, dado que atingem resultados
de topo com um investimento moderado. Existem igualmente outros países onde os resultados são muito
bons, mas no entanto o nível de despesa é muito elevado. Os restantes países não alcançam os resultados
desejados, donde que não são nem eficientes nem eficazes. De notar, no entanto, que a Suécia e a Noruega
são particularmente ineficientes porque têm uma enorme despesa em educação e alcançam resultados
médios muito baixos.
Palavras-chave: eficiência da educação, gasto público, resultados do PISA, eficácia da educação.
Résumé Une analyse de la dépense globale en matière d’éducation a été comparée avec les résultats dans le test
PISA (2012) comme méthode pour comprendre le rapport entre les dépenses en matière d’éducation et la
performance des élèves. Nous avons analysé les dépenses globales en éducation, le salaire des enseignants, la
dimension des classes et le nombre de classes enseignées, ainsi que l’investissement en ressources
d’infrastructure et d’enseignement dans les pays européens. Quatre groupes d’efficacité sont proposées sur la
base de la combinaison des résultats par rapport aux dépenses. Il a été conclu que les pays les plus efficaces sont
la Pologne, la Slovénie et la République Tchèque, car ils ateignent les meilleurs résultats avec un investissement
modéré. Il y a aussi des pays où les résultats sont très bons mais le niveau des dépenses est très élevé. Les autres
pays n’ont pas atteint les résultats souhaités et donc ne sont pas efficaces. Notez, cependant, que la Suède et la
Norvège sont particulièrement inefficaces parce qu’ils ont une énorme dépense en éducation pour atteindre de
très faibles résultats moyens.
Mots-clés: efficacité en éducation, dépenses publiques, résultats du PISA.
Resumen Un análisis del gasto agregado en la educación se comparó con los resultados del programa PISA
(2012) como una manera de entender la conexión de los gastos en la educación al rendimiento del estudiante. Se
analizó el gasto agregado en la educación, el salario de los profesores, el tamaño de las clases y el número de
clases que se imparten, así como la inversión en infraestructura y recursos de enseñanza en los países europeos.
Se proponen cuatro grupos de eficiencia / eficacia basada en la combinación frente a los resultados de gastos. Se
concluyó que los países más eficientes son Polonia, Eslovenia y República Checa como lograr los mejores
resultados con una inversión moderada. También hay otros países en los que los resultados son muy buenos, sin
embargo, el nivel de gasto es muy alto. Otros no logran los resultados deseados de la que no son ni eficiente ni
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eficaz. Tengase en cuenta, sin embargo, que Suecia y Noruega son particularmente ineficientes porque tiene un
enorme gasto en educación y logra resultados promedios muy bajos.
Palabras-clave: eficiencia de la educación, gasto público, los resultados de PISA, la eficacia de la educación.
Introduction
This paper has the objective of throwing some light on the important subject of ed-
ucation efficiency.Measuring both input and output in social investment is always
delicate and far from being straightforward, though it is vital to a well-oiled
system.
This area brings economics andpolicy together in giving attention to the form
how data can be used andmodelled to help better andmore accurate decisions for
the system. In a world with finite resources, knowing the price of educating citi-
zens, and how to better use the investment to maximize the outcome is a central
question topoliticians,managers, parents and every taxpayer.Amore efficient sys-
tem does not need to be feared as disinvestment in education andworst service for
citizens.Welch (1998) argues that historically “efficiency”means blind cuts to edu-
cation. Politicians, economists, school managers can not turn a blind eye on where
to spend the money. More money in the system is not, always, a meaning for qual-
ity. Efficiency is about choosing themost efficientmix, and deciding inwhere to in-
vest (Woessmann and Schuetz, 2006).
The amount of money that gets into the system is not always calculated, nor
reported. It is hard to have the exact accountancy of values as this is a very big field,
and investment tends to extend through long periods of time. Frequently, projects
are abandonedwithout completion, bringing extra pain in the calculation of costs.
Lack of transparency in public accounts is another hardship that the researcher has
to face, and it is often impossible to trace information backwards in the effort of re-
constructing the investment path.
On theoutput side, there are alsodifficult answers to solve. In subjects such as
the economics of education there has been an intensediscussiononwhat is the final
goal of education, and how can we measure school effects. On the one hand, it is
well known that family, social, economic and cultural background of each child is
determinant for her success (Coleman, 1967). Some systems, that may look ineffi-
cient, are just paying the long term price of badly educated parents. As “the chil-
dren of today are the parents of tomorrow” (Afonso and Aubyn, 2005) education
results will also improve, in a ceteris-paribus environment. Universal school access
has a major role in increasing equality and in the long term improving results
(Lemos, 2013). Despite realising the importance of family background on achieve-
ment this variable would be odd to introduce in this model, as there are no
significant differences among most countries, except for Portugal which shows,
comparatively, very low education background. As shown by Martins and Veiga
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(2010) the differences are more evident when comparing socio-economic indica-
tors, andnot asmuchwhenonly parents’ education or parents’ occupation come in
themodel.At country level there seems to be an associationbetweenhigher level of
parents’ qualification (or white collar jobs) and better results in Maths, though
these differences are harder to spot at an aggregate level as, for example, children
of cleaners in some countries outperform children of managers in other countries
(OECD, 2014). As the cost of education and other investments are considered in
PPPs we are already considering economic differences at aggregate level.
Despite all the above considerations, schools make a big difference in a soci-
ety, and shouldbe seen as the central point of everypublic policy (Rodrigues, 2012).
Education is a pillar of the economic system,with long term consequences for each
and every economy.
The objective of this paper is to bring together education aggregate variables
that are related to cost and expenditure, compare those to outcome variables
(Maths PISA scores) and observe how countries are organising themselves.
Theory and inspiration
Adam Smith, back in the XVII century, has pioneered measuring education pro-
ductivity, inspired onmanufacturing processes.Many other economists and social
researchers (Hanushek, 1986; Lockheed and Hanushek, 1994; Welch, 1998) have
been looking for a productivity function to associate with education.
Educationoutput is difficult tomeasuredue tomanynon-controllable factors
involved in the equation: student individual factors, social circumstances, govern-
ment priorities, school daily practices among others (Wagstaff, 2011). Input is not
also straight forward, though it is possible to tackle purchased inputs such as sala-
ries, infrastructures, teaching resources; it is not obvious how to include motiva-
tion and donations of all sorts.
Despite the complexity, progress has beenmade, and academics have thrived
lines of research. Based on the idea of cost-benefit, to tackle the increase in produc-
tivity, different lines of policy have emerged. “Productivity in education is con-
cerned with the quantity and quality of outcome that results from a given level of
resources” (Rice and Schwartz, 2008).
Hanushek (1986) following the pioneering work of Coleman Report
(Coleman, 1967), has developed work on costing education and investigating
if money makes a difference to results. At the time, he came to a mixed conclu-
sion suggesting that there was no clear correlation between extra money and
better student results. This conclusion spread misunderstandings and was
many times used by politicians wanting to reduce budgets. Nevertheless, dur-
ing the early 2000s many other studies (Baker, 2012; Mccluskey, 2004) have
been developed, using better data and more modern analysis techniques to
conclude that money does make a difference, especially the goods and ser-
vices money can buy make a difference. So the important question is: how can
we use limited resources wisely?
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Most research end up focusing on teacher both in quality and quantity, as
they are seen as a pillar of the system and also account for the greatest share of in-
vestment. Recently a group of researchers launched The Efficiency Index (Dolton,
Marcenaro-Gutiérrez and Still, 2014) where only two variables are considered as
inputs— teacher pay and the number of pupils per teacher. Though the Efficiency
Index is an attempt to systematise this concept, it is very narrow scope and can lead
to mal-interpretations.
Can schools deliver a better outcome for the same investment? How much
will it cost to increase the outcome?
Answering these questions involves knowledge of the productive structure:
prices to pay for inputs (salaries, infrastructures…) and the extent towhich schools
are inefficient. Governments know thatmoneymatters (Baker, 2012) thoughno au-
thor has been able to find a direct relation.
Recent research has moved from simple analysis of global amounts to what
money can buy — quality of schools’ buildings, teacher quality and motivation,
class size, among others. Random studies in Tennessee (Hanushek, 2012) have
shown that class size matters, though further studies are still needed as it does not
work as a magic bullet for results’ improvement.
Complex theory has often been called into action as a way to disentangle the
variables associated with learning. Education efficiency should be seen as a com-
plex circular system, where funding should generate opportunities for learning;
given those opportunities students will learn and show their knowledge on stu-
dentperformance indicators. Those indicators influence future fundingdecisions.
Question and structure
The questions underneath the research were: “How efficiently is the money in-
vested in education?”; “Can we spot any pattern of investment that is tailored to
better results?”; “Which countries have the best relation — investment, expendi-
ture, results?”; “Can countries copy each other on education efficiency?”
To measure these relations, we used as dependent variable the quantitative
indicator given by PISA to work as a proxy of education output. This is one of the
few measurements that compare students’ knowledge across countries. The rela-
tively small differences among the absolute performance of countries may not
heighten real system specificities nor the relation amongweak and strong aspects.
As we are comparing only European countries the convergence to the middle is
natural, as these countries end up not being so different in socio and economic
stages of development.
Independent variables were stratified into three big groups:
— How much money comes into the system and how it is spent?
— What is being bought by money and how each of those items influences
outcome?
— To which extent investment is properly used by school communities?
160 Isabel Flores
SOCIOLOGIA, PROBLEMAS E PRÁTICAS, n.º 83, 2017, pp. 157-170. DOI: 10.7458/SPP2017836496
To focus on the quantity of money into the system we used global annual amount
per student as presented by OECD’s Education at a Glance 2013 (OECD, 2013). All
the money values are United States Dollars (USD) and in Parity Purchasing Power
(PPPs), in order to facilitate comparison. The distribution of current and capital ex-
penditure were also analysed, and the major differences identified.
The second stagewas to describe howmoney is spent in each European state,
what is granted to each resource and also how countries diverge from one another
in education expenditure structure. A regression of results to expenditure struc-
ture was also developed.
Finally, a clusteringmodel is suggestedwhere groups of countries are formed
according to their level of investment, expenditure, qualitative and quantitative
results.
Money in education systems
Funding for educationwas gathered fromOECD’sEducation at a Glance 2013,1 from
their chapter B: “Financial and human resources invested in education”.
From those indicators, some of greater relevance for the objective of this pa-
per were selected and analysed:
— expenditure on education — per student as a percentage of GDP in PPPs;
— where is the money spent?
— what is the relative cost of teachers’ and what is left for other expenses?
How much money does education need?
The amount of money a country spends educating each child is associated with the
global richness of that country, here measured in GDP per capita. Figure 1 illustrates
this point clearly as it features a linear regressionwith anR2 = 0.72,meaning that coun-
trieswithhighGDPinvestmore thanpoorer countries. Thismeans that thevariance in
GDP per capita accounts for 72% of the variance in education per child budget.
The country with the highest spending per student is Switzerland followed by
Norway (with a per student expenditure of 16,000 USD and 14,000 USD), who are
clearly outliers spending muchmore than any other OECD country. On the opposite
extreme, there are Hungary and Slovak Republic with three times less expenditure,
both around 5000 USD. For this group of countries, the average is 9750 USD. United
Kingdom, Netherlands, Spain, Germany and Finland are very near average.
Follows the obvious question: “Is there a connection between money spent
per student and their assessment results?” 2
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1 http://www.oecd.org/edu/educationataglance2013-indicatorsandannexes.htm
2 As already stated the author has opted to use PISA’s Math score as a proxy of school outcome.
There is a high correlation with the results in the other tested subjects, Language and Science.
Maths was under special scrutiny in 2012, so the results are broader.
Avery moderate positive correlation (R2 = 10.7%) is shown in PISA’s average
scores to expenditure per student and also to GDP. Countries investing relatively
small amounts have achieved very positive results (Poland, Czech Republic and
Slovenia), but some countries with enormous investment have scored well below
the international average (Norway, Italy, Sweden). The picture is totallymixed and
shows thatmoney is certainly important, though it is not a sufficient reason for suc-
cess. Norway, Italy and Sweden are countries where money is not being used effi-
ciently, while Poland is an example of efficient use of resources.
What money can buy?
Our next question is: “Where is themoney spent andwhat evidence dowe have to
analyze the efficiency of expenditure?”
In every country the biggest share of education expenditure is to face current
expenses— salaries and daily consumption goods. Avery small percentage of ex-
pense is left for capital, i.e. for investment in infrastructure, computers and librar-
ies. The countries with the highest relative investment in capital are the United
Kingdom, Norway and Netherlands with more than 10% going to capital invest-
ment, therefore, all the other countries spendmore than 90%of their available bud-
gets in salaries and daily running of schools.
Money buys teachers
Current investment takes most of the money and teachers are thought to take the
biggest slice. Nevertheless, data shows that this is not the case for most countries;
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Expenditure per student PISA
Figure 1 GDP per capita versus education expenditure per student and PISA’s Maths Scores
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2013, and PISA 2012.
only Portugal, Spain and Sweden spend more than 70% of their budgets paying
teachers. In Switzerland a teacher costs over 10,000 USD per student while in the
United Kingdom the cost is about 3000 USD. Does this represent poor pay or a
better use of human resources?Why are there some countries with just about 1000
USD to spend on all other expenses, while some other countriesmanage to reserve
more than 6000 USD per student? Is there a relation between the teacher cost per
student and performance? What about teacher salary and performance?
To have a low expenditure per student does not mean an annual average low
teachers’pay in every country. In fact, theUnitedKingdomspends about 3000USD
per student to pay for teacher’swork, but teachers’salary is around 45,000USDper
year. The annual salary is similar to Belgium’s though it has a per student cost of
8000 USD. Once again, Switzerland has the highest pay (60,000 USD)while Slovak
Republic just pays 12,000 USD in line with the lowest cost per student.
The relation between teacher pay and PISA scores is mild. Despite a positive
trend, this variable accounts for only 26% of the variance in results (R2 = 0.26 out of
an univariable linear regression). Therefore I have turned my attention to the ob-
servation of countries that formgroups according to these variables. Firstly, Poland
and Czech Republic form a cluster where the students’ score above 500, and teach-
ers receive less than average.We can also identify a groupwhere high pay is in line
with high scores (Switzerland, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Finland, Den-
mark and Ireland). A third groupwith average pay and scores below the 500mile-
stone (Sweden, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom). Iceland,
France, Slovenia form a group with average pay and average results. Finally, the
cluster where very low paid teachers correspond to low scores (Hungary and Slo-
vak Republic).
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Total expenditure per student Teachers' expenditure per student
Figure 2 Relation between expenditure and teacher annual pay, per student
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2013.
Another perspective is to compare teachers’ pay with the national average pay,
as a proxy of how well paid teachers feel, when compared to their fellow citizens.
The countrywhere teachers have the highest relative pay is Portugal, where
teachers receive 60% above national average, though their students do not
achieve high scores. There is only a very weak link (R2 = 0.042) between relative
pay and scores. Hungary, Norway, Sweden, Slovak Republic, France and Poland
are countries where teachers receive less than the country’s average. Math’s re-
sults are all bellow 500, exception made to Poland.
The inexistence of relationship between teachers’pay and PISAscores shows
that it is not payment thatmakes the difference, it does not increase the outcome of
the systems. In the efficiency scale Poland, Slovenia and Czech Republic are the
most efficient, while, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom are the least effective
as the relative pay to teachers is high, and the results are below the 500 PISApoints.
There is no clear strategy to be adopted regarding teacher salaries. Further studies
should be developed to understand the importance of salaries in quality. That
question goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Money buys class sizes and teaching hours
Class size and the number of hours students receive of effective teaching is one of
the big areas of immediate political intervention.
School has gained a full-time character to fulfil its social support role. As both
parents have full-time jobs, children need to be cared for by schools.
These two variables should be analysed together as they reflect how to use
teacher’s lecturing hours — either work more hours in bigger groups or fewer
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Figure 3 Ratio of teacher pay to national average pay on PISA’s Math scores
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2013, and PISA 2012.
hours in smaller groups. Do students needmany hours of taught classes, or would
they perform better with less time being taught but in smaller groups with more
opportunities for personalised attention?
As Sahlberg (2011) clarifies, fewer hours of schooling, less homework, more
freedom is a pillar of Finnish success (Finland keeps students in school for about 24
hours per week). Obviously this is not the case with the countries under observa-
tion. Different choices seem to lead to similar results.
As can be clearly seen in figure 4 (table), not every country considers this
trade-off: Finland, Denmark, Belgium and Iceland have a policy of small groups
(less than 21 students per class), thought they have different strategies in terms of
the number of teaching hours. On the opposite extreme, France and Hungary
group the students in big classes and France opts for keeping students in school for
long periods of time.
Figure 4 depicts the ratio of teaching hours to class size as the number of
hours each student is entitled to as individual teacher attention.
Once again, there is no clear relation between individual teaching time and
PISAscores. Clusters of strategies are visible on figure 4.Only theUnitedKingdom
falls out of the groups as it falls in themiddle of the scheme— the average number
of hours of individual teaching time, and also about average results.
Spain, Italy, Portugal, Iceland and Sweden give students big opportunities
for individual teaching, though they all perform below the 500 PISA standard
average.With a similar strategy of teachers’ time availability, butwith above av-
erage scores countries like Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, Ireland and Den-
mark can be found. On the other hand, teachers’ individual attention can be low,
and results can still excel. This happens in countries such as Poland, Germany
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Figure 4 Ratio of annual learning time to class size (table) and PISA Math’s Scores
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2013, and PISA 2012.
and Slovenia. The last group comprises countries that are low achievers, but the
teachers’ time investment is also low — France, Norway, Slovak Republic and
Hungary.
The old argument that there isn’t enough money to increase the number of
hours of individual attention is a fallacy. There is no direct relation between the ex-
penditure per student and the number of hours of individual teaching. It is a politi-
cal and management strategy, not financial.
It is not the amount of money, but the decision on where to spend it. Norway
is a country with the highest expenditure but only 33 hours per year of individual
teaching are available.On the range 10,000-12,000USDexpenditureper studentwe
find all sorts of teacher availability. Germany has barely 30 hours per year, while
Belgium presents its students with almost 45 hours.
Comparing yearly individual teaching time (calculated as the ratio between
number of teaching hours received by students and class size) to PISA scores the
most efficient countries are Poland andGermany.On the other hand, themost inef-
ficient are Spain, Portugal and Italy.
Money buys infrastructures and school resources
Denmark, a country with the highest hourly payment, reserves 50% of its current
budget for teachers’ salary and the other half is parted among other staff and other
expenses.
Czech Republic (similar to Portugal in terms of GDP and per student expendi-
ture) spends 46.9% of its education budget on teachers’ salary and 39% on other cur-
rent expenses.Although teacher’s hourlypayment is low, theyhave clearly opted for
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Figure 5 Expenditure per student and yearly individual teaching time
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2013, and PISA 2012.
a different spendingmodel. Portugal spends almost all its budget on teaching, being
left with only 6% for capital investment (infrastructures and equipment).
In PISA2012 school directorswere asked about their perception of the quality
of the infrastructure andalso on thequality of resources available for teaching. This
is not an absolute measure, but it measures the perceived impact of capital invest-
ments in the life of its users.
There are five countrieswhere the directors think poorly of infrastructures—
Portugal, Norway, Netherlands, Finland and Italy. In this group, though, Portu-
guese and Dutch directors seem to be pleased with education resources. The hap-
piest countries with infrastructures are Poland, Czech Republic and Sweden.
In relation to education resources Slovak Republic and Iceland are the most
unhappy. Norwich and Finish directors are not also very pleasedwith educational
resources.
We had already seen that countries spend different proportions of education
expenditure in capital. Some countries are heavy investors in capital, investing
around 15%of the education budget, andothers leave virtually nothing to this type
of investment.
Despite the spending strategy, there is no connection between perceived
quality of infrastructures and the amount of money spent.
In Norway, where investment in infrastructure is about 1800 USD per year
per student, schoolmanagers have very negative opinions. Collectively, they qual-
ify infrastructures at the same level of countries like Portugal where very little in-
vestment is made (less than 300 USD per student per year).
On the opposite side Poland, with very little investment (about 300 USD) has
very satisfied managers.
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Figure 6 Capital expenditure per student per year on PISA’s index Quality of Physical Infrastructure
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2013 and PISA 2012.
Once again Poland is heading the group of themost efficientmanagers, small
investment high levels of satisfaction. This group is also comprised by Czech Re-
public, Iceland, Hungary and Belgium.
Managing the infrastructure and the relation to expenditure level of satisfac-
tion is efficient in many countries, as in most countries expenditure is relatively
low and school directors are quite satisfied.Norway and theNetherlands are obvi-
ously the least efficient.
Conclusion: an efficiency scale
The final objective of this paper is to propose an efficiency scale based on the previ-
ous indicators.
The methodology for its development was by creating a table with all the
variables described above and classify each country according to efficiency:
Where countrieswith a higher score are least efficient, and not effective at all.
— One point— the country has an efficient behaviour in relation to the variable
— achieves PISA scores above 500 at a relatively low cost.
— Twopoints—The country has an effective behaviour—achieves results abo-
ve 500 Points at a relatively high cost.
— Threepoints—Doesnot achieve thedesired results but the amount of resour-
ces spent is also low.
— Four points — Does not achieve the desired results but spends many
resources.
In terms of global efficiency, it is possible to clearly identify the four groups.
Poland, Slovenia and Czech Republic are the most efficient countries, mean-
ing PISA scores above average and directors’ satisfaction towards infrastructures
and resourceswere demonstrated in 2012. They are considered efficient as expense
and general use of resources were low. They did better with lower resources. They
are all ex-soviet allies where education is a strong social asset.
The second group, constituted by Germany, Belgium, Ireland, Switzerland,
Denmark, Netherlands and Finland presented results above average but a lot of
moneywas thrown into the system, though they are all countries with a high GDP
per capita and a long tradition in educating their fellow citizens.
South and east poor European countries integrate the third group, where the
United Kingdom emerges as the surprising exception. Results do not get to the de-
sired level, though not enough resources are in the system, or the money is not be-
ing spent efficiently.
Finally, we have a group of just two countries who are very rich and spend
much money on education though results are not reaching the desired levels —
Norway and Sweden. These countries should reconsider how they are spending
the money and reallocate resources more efficiently. They are neither efficient nor
effective.
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